Description
In fragile and conflict-affected states, local populations and external actors (especially from the West) can speak of the same non-state armed group in completely different terms. To the international community, these groups are security threats that must be contained or eliminated. To citizens of fragile states, these groups are just as likely to be security providers as security threats. How is it possible for the same group to be perceived so differently? To answer this question, this article proposes that fragile states and the international community do not share the Rules of the Game, but rather employ two separate sets of rules for war-to-peace transitions. Each set of rules is internally consistent to the world that conceived it, but viewed side-by-side, there is a yawning gap between them in terms of values, assumptions, and local understandings of how power, influence, and violence are used. Where the international community sees the institutional changes that need to be made in order to achieve a Good State, FCAS community members see a Personalized State that is subject to the weakest link problem. Where the international community prioritizes Security Sector Reform, local communities in fragile pragmatically evaluate which actor or armed group is the most capable of security provision. Where the international community views the law as impartial and fixed, FCAS citizens know that it is relative and malleable. Given such different understandings about what is expected by the international community and how non-state armed groups operate on the ground, this article serves as a “translation device” between these two worlds. It reveals that the international community conceives of core issues like Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law very differently from the populations that it serves.
