Description
There is a growing interest among peacekeeping scholars in studying the role of agent-level factors in analyzing the effectiveness of peace operations. They have investigated such matters as the mechanisms through which individuals within peace operations can have influence, but also the importance of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) in mediating norm conflicts. Evaluations of efforts to protect civilians also point to the importance of the willingness of individual commanders to take risks to do so. I build on this literature, but expand the investigation by proposing a systematic framework for analyzing the agency of the leadership of peace operations who operate within structural constraints and against the background of a specific risk context. In particular, I highlight their risk tolerance, their normative convictions, and the extent to which they are more or less diplomatic in their relations with domestic and international partners. Apart from looking at SRSGs, I also investigate how other key mission leaders (such as the Force Commander and the Director of the Human Rights Division) have an impact on the effectiveness of peace operations and how their agency differs from that of the SRSG. I discuss both how to see agency (the independent variable) and effectiveness (the dependent variable) of peace operations. I then test the proposed framework through a mix of a larger cross-case comparison, looking at whether and how changes in the leadership of UN peace operations impact their effectiveness, and two additional case studies to investigate the relationship in more detail.
