Description
This paper radically reinterprets virtue ethics and neo-Hegalian theories of the self, through the lens of clarifying the relationship of each to human rights. At first glance, there are strong reasons to think that virtue ethics and theories of the self are incompatible with the contemporary idea of human rights. Virtue ethics seems incompatible because of the power and class-based attributes typically associated with ‘virtuous’ agents, and because of the approach's emphasis on the particular over the universal. In a similar vein, theories of the self seem too introspective; in emphasising the responsibilities of the powerful to respond, they potentially de-centre and de-prioritise the rights and agency of the ‘other’. This paper moves beyond these conservative interpretations of the two traditions. In doing so, it preserves what is most significant: the need for moral agents to reconstitute their identities so that human rights form a part of themselves. This can re-equip these currently-stale traditions for the challenges of the present, at a time when the world is actively contemplating the possible 'end' of the human rights project. At the same time, it helps to re-define the meaning of obligations to "respect" human rights.
