Description
This paper seeks to contribute to the limited but growing literature on jus ex bello by focussing on one issue in particular: surrender. It will focus on works of regular war theory, orthodox just war theory and political realism due to their support of the independence between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and the moral equality of combatants.
By examining the arguments of Emer de Vattel and Michael Walzer, it will argue that the principles expressed in their theories are congruent with and in fact require consideration of this question. It will do this by analysing the positions of each on how they relate to: state responsibilities, what they are and what their limits are; the conditions under which war should be limited; and their position on international law.
Using the positions of Morgenthau and Clausewitz, it will address two concerns that arise from arguing that states have a duty to surrender under certain circumstances, namely that, firstly, such an argument endorses appeasement and, secondly, that such surrender would in itself compromise national interest. It will conclude that surrender does not necessarily entail appeasement nor compromising national interest, and that the theories of Vattel and Walzer require consideration of the ethics of surrender.