Description
This paper analyses the differing and diverging responses of the European Union (EU) and its member states to Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and demonstrates the challenges which contemporary Chinese foreign policy presents for EU foreign policy and cohesion. Its central puzzle addresses normative contestation in Sino-European discourse regarding the primary institutions of Sovereignty, International Law, and Market Economy. The paper deploys the toolset of the English School – international society and primary institutions – in its analysis of discourse and further draws on constructivist norm contestation theory. The findings show evidence for contestation and increasing tension in Sino-European discourse and relations since the beginning of Xi Jinping’s presidency. And further, that the BRI, while at first a projection screen for normative contestation, eventually became subject to contestation itself. Based on these findings, the paper advances three arguments. First, that found normative contestation is rooted in a clash between solidarist interpretations of primary institutions, on part of the EU and its member states, and pluralist interpretations on part of China. Second, that the variegated EU member-state responses vis-à-vis the BRI demonstrate the challenges which Xi Jinping’s initiative presents to EU unity and cohesion, especially in foreign policymaking. And third, that the findings do indeed point to Chinese statespersons contesting solidarist, Western-liberal interpretations of primary institutions in their exchanges with the EU and its member-states, i.e. resisting solidarisation. Moreover, that in contesting these interpretations, which ultimately stand for a Western-liberal order, China is proposing an alternative, pluralist order.
