Description
Great power rivalry for resources, territory and influence is once again being played out in the vast and environmentally sensitive Arctic region, influencing its economic and military security.
Russia – whose Polar zone is twice as large as that of the second largest Arctic power, Canada – is determined upon remaining the dominant player in the region by increasing its military presence. The emerging superpower China, defining itself as a “near Arctic state” and a regional stakeholder in 2018, is intent on increasing its regional influence and incorporating Arctic states in its Belt and Road trade initiative. In its 2017 National Security Strategy, 2018 National Defense Strategy and 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S. Government assigns priority to strategic competition with China and Russia over other strategic interests. These documents enunciate the view that the U.S.-led liberal international order is being challenged by its authoritarian rivals China and Russia. The 2019 U.S. Department of Defence Arctic Strategy and 2019 U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook outline its new strategic approach for protecting U.S. national security interests in the Arctic. Through the lens of geopolitical theory, this paper examines the broader background for the shift in U.S. Arctic strategy and discusses the implications of renewed great power competition in the region, comprising eight states with distinct Arctic identities and interests. Some – like Canada – are intent on asserting and maintaining sovereignty in the Arctic. Others – like the Nordic countries – assign priority to multilateral cooperation on Arctic environmental protection, economics and trade, although their detailed priority-setting differ significantly. I conclude that although the U.S. competitive Arctic strategy reflects the fact that geopolitics have become the main frame of strategy for the foreign policies of China, Russia and the U.S., overlapping interests may still forge regional cooperation.
