Description
The post-2000 spurt of regional integration in Latin America was marked by pronouncements of being categorically different from the exuberant history of regionalism in the region. This categorical difference was enunciated especially in terms of the logic of development that these new organisations espoused, decidedly in favour of a rejection of the neoliberal model of development. Organisations such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nation (CELAC) argued for a more inclusive integration agenda that was beyond trade and more directed towards creating solidarity.
Led by the enthusiastic political leadership of an economically robust Brazil under President Lula Da Silva and petroleum wealth backed Venezuela under Hugo Chavez, this alternative regional vision seemed to flourish with abandon for awhile. However, with the post-commodity price boom economic downturn as well as the changes in political leadership in the region, this spat of regional enunciation seemed to collapse onto its own with the old evils of strong presidentialism and lack of institutional infrastructure in the face of waning political will again being named as the biggest culprits, responsible for the failure of this project.
This paper attempts to argue that despite the failure and stalemate of the three organisations, the issue and policy areas consolidated during the period remain potentially useful. It aims to explain the difference in the leadership projects under Brazil and Venezuela, as evidenced in the formation of agendas in the three organisations to argue that the processes of bottom up social participation in setting of the Brazilian integration agenda have enabled deeper integration and possibilities of reactivation remain potent, unlike the top-down Venezuelan leadership project. This paper hopes to comparatively study the same.
