Description
In the Middle East, Lebanon is considered a unique example of a somewhat successful and stable power-sharing democracy; a deeply divided society where for three decades a confessional framework reserves equal political representation for Muslims and Christians. Since 2006, however, the opposition led by Hezbollah pleaded for a so-called guaranteeing third vote, and a Cabinet minority veto was finally obtained under the 2008 Doha Agreement. Since then, little international discussion has been done neither on how the group built its narrative to obtain the blocking third, nor on its actual behaviour in a consensus government cabinet. This paper is divided into two parts. The purpose of the first part is to unravel how the narrative pairing resistance and representation was constructed by the opposition, demanding equitable political representation and stronger decision-making power over strategic issues. For that, I propose a historical-qualitative analysis of 31 public statements from 2006 to 2008 made by Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, allied with a review of the key moments of institutional crisis that led to the Doha Agreement. Results from the first part sustain the construction of a sui generis narrative that is both anti-sectarian as well as nurturing enhanced autonomy and empowerment for the disenfranchised Shia, especially by differentiating formal participation in the pre-2008 confessional framework from autonomous representation in post-2008 Doha. Regionally, this power rebalancing speaks to the rise of the so-called ‘axis of resistance’ or ‘Shi’a Crescent’. The second part of this paper investigates the opposition’s confrontation behaviour in the cabinet from 2008 to 2018. By tracking and analysing key moments of executive blockages and ministers’ resignations through domestic newspapers, backed up by elite interviews, I inquire about the nature of the veto, its extent, and under what contextual conditions it occurred. Results from the second part indicate that purposeful vetoes by the blocking opposition were thematic, demanded inter-sectarian alliances and were not as indiscriminate as the literature has previously supposed. The findings suggest that in confessional regimes of national coalition, veto-minorities are not necessarily only authoritarian. In practice, highly liberal and informal genres of veto are equally applied by the various religious communities as an instrument of representation, identity leverage, and protection of their vital interests.
