Description
In December 2019, NATO finally declared space an ‘operational domain’. While space is becoming even more contested and the threats ever more varied (ranging from kinetic, electronic to cyber), traditional deterrence approaches are no longer appropriate. Yet, there is little in the literature examining theoretical or policy implications in terms of applying deterrence theory to the domain of space and in connection to collective security organisations. Michael Krepon (2013) defines space deterrence as ‘deterring harmful actions by whatever means against national assets in space and assets that support space operations’. Applying this to the collective security level, this paper seeks to investigate the extent to which the US and its European allies can ‘both minimize the risk of inadvertent escalation and maximize the effectiveness of deterrence and defense against advertent escalation’ (Harrison et al, 2017). This paper is a first step into examining the theoretical implications of what space deterrence means at the collective security level. While a second goal is to assess implications that stem from challenges posed by ‘attribution’, ‘reversibility’, ‘resilience’ and ‘thresholds’ and applying these to more tailored and contemporary deterrence strategies.
