Description
Abstract
Why is it possible to insist that other states should not commit crimes against humanity against their own populations? Responses to this question are often articulated by an appeal to the universality of our common humanity and the need to protect it, yet frequently without much further clarification. It is thus argued that the existence of a common humanity provides certain moral obligations for both states and individuals when mass atrocity crimes are committed. But to what extent can we say that obligations created by an appeal to common humanity carry moral weight? In addressing this lacuna, the paper will move beyond claims that such crimes are simply ‘conscience-shocking’ in order to better conceptualise the impact these crimes have on the values and ideas that are essential to our existence as human beings. It will be argued that such crimes can be seen to challenge a dual conception of humanity, generating not only a harm against the diversity of humankind but also challenging our distinct humanness, understood through our ability to coexist as political animals, as well as our capacity to develop moral rules. The focus is therefore not to assess the strength of crimes against humanity as a legal concept but instead to theorise the idea of a collective harm by locating the values and beliefs which are directly challenged by crimes against humanity. This will then make it possible to further conceptualise the international scope of such crimes and thus reinforce the moral imperative for the protection of populations from these crimes, by the global community.
