Description
Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters constitutes a key element of the UK-EU post-Brexit relationship, enabling both partners to maintain a good level of internal security provision for their citizens (Davies and Carrapico, forthcoming). This has been made possible through the negotiation of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which includes the most advanced level of internal security cooperation the EU has signed with a third country. Although the TCA does not replicate the same level of cooperation the UK used to benefit from as a EU Member State, the outcome of the negotiations was considerably more positive than initially expected (Mitsilegas and Guild, 2023). This outcome is surprising for a number of reasons: the overall politicisation of the UK-EU relationship, the resulting decline in trust between the UK and the EU, the lack of UK bargaining power, the EU27 aversion to ‘cherry picking’ and contagion, and the absence of security and defence from the TCA (Martill and Sus, 2021). Bearing this context in mind, the paper proposes to explore how the UK managed to secure a positive deal in this policy area. It does so by discussing how the following elements shaped its bargaining assumptions and power, as well as negotiation positions: 1) the perceived leadership role of the UK in Justice and Home Affairs (MacKenzie, 2024); 2) the role of historical Justice and Home Affairs’ opt opt-ins and opt-outs (Schimmelfennig et al. 2022); 3) the degree of EU integration characterising this policy field (Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2017); and 4) the nature of the policy field. The article aims to contribute to a fast-growing academic literature focusing on UK foreign policy and its approach to Brexit negotiations (Glencross, 2022; Meislova and Glencross, 2023), through the insights of a policy field which has so far received limited attention (for exceptions, please see Kaunert et al., 2020; Pencheva, 2021; Wolff et al., 2022).
