Description
Developing causal knowledge is one of the central tasks of academic research in the discipline of International Relations (IR). Among other things, such knowledge underpins our capacity to explain, to predict, and to manipulate the world (and advance prescriptions for doing so). However, developing causal knowledge is hard. In IR, methodological writings often present a short ‘checklist’ of ‘causal criteria’ against which to judge whether a given causal claim is well supported. These include ‘criteria’ such as covariation of cause and effect, the temporal precedence of the cause in relation to the effect, and the elimination of competing explanations. However, there is considerable inconsistency in whether such criteria are proposed and, if they are, which criteria are included. Moreover, detailed rationales are rarely offered for why particular criteria (indeed, any criteria) should be applied. By contrast, in epidemiology there is a fairly well established set of causal criteria (most famously adumbrated by Bradford Hill) which are widely used to support public health decision-making and around which there is an extensive scholarly debate. The aim of this paper is hence to explore the contribution that a more detailed specification of (and rationale for) causal criteria might make to research in IR. We both examine the rationale for including particular causal criteria and illustrate their utility by reference to substantive examples of empirical research in IR using a variety of methods.
